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"two factor formula of creditor entry and debtor response"48 provides merely
a guideline for judicial inquiry, and lower courts will ultimately have to
decide each breach of peace question on its own facts.
RicHARD CANDELORA

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
FLORIDA'S RIGHT OF REPLY STATUTE
Tornillo v. Miami Herald PublishingCo., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973)
Plaintiff, a candidate for nomination to the Florida House of Representatives, was criticized in two editorials appearing in a newspaper published by
defendant.' Plaintiff claimed a right of reply under Florida Statutes, section
104.38,2 and submitted a response to be published verbatim, at defendant's
expense. Upon defendant's refusal to comply with the statute, plaintiff filed
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief and punitive damages in civil

48. Id. at 624; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 967 (1972). The instant court approved the statement that judicial inquiry should focus upon whether the creditor entered the debtor's premises, the type of
premises entered, the presence or absence of debtor consent, the possibility of creditor deceit
in procuring consent, and third-party response.
I. The first editorial referred to the alleged illegal activities of the Classroom Teachers'
Association (CTA), which plaintiff had led in the Dade County strike in 1972. Miami (Fla.)
Herald, Sept. 20, 1972, §A at 6, col. I. The second editorial stated that the plaintiff had been
"kicking the public shin" for years, and had been trying unduly to use or obtain public
funds for the benefit of the CTA. Miami (Fla.) Herald, Sept. 29, 1972, §A at 6, col. 3.
2. FILA. STAT. §104.38 (1971) provides in part: "If any newspaper in its columns assails
the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or
charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his
official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon
request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto
in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such
reply, provided such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any
person or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first degree . ..."
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court. 3 The Dade County Circuit Court held the statute violative of the first
and fourteenth amendments. 4 On direct appeal, 5 the Florida supreme court
reversed and remanded and HELD, Florida's right of reply statute was not in
conflict with the principles underlying the first amendment to the United
States Constitution or to article I, section 4, of the Florida constitution.6
Under the first amendment the United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld the right of the press to publish free from governmental
interference. 7 In only a few instances has intervention been allowed, principally in the area of libelous publications." Even this restriction is a narrow
one 9 having been applied by the courts with increasing reluctance.' 0 Except
in unusual circumstances,"' it is well settled that any prior restraint on publication'12 or any attempt to compel publication of commercial 3 or editorial- 4
advertising will be struck down. Thus, the press has been traditionally re-

3. The attorney general was notified of the suit pursuant to FLA. STAT. §86.091 (1971),
and was represented at the emergency hearing held by Judge Francis J. Christie on Oct. 2,
1972. His representative advised the judge that the attorney general had refused to appeal
State v. News-Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp. 164 (County J. Ct. Volusia County 1972), which
held FLA. STAT. §104.38 (1971) unconstitutional. The attorney general had doubts as to the
validity of the right of reply statute, and therefore would not defend the statute in the
instant case. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80, 82 (Cir. Ct. Dade
County 1972).
4. 38 Fla. Supp. at 80.
5. FLA. CONST. art. V, §3(b)(1). Jurisdiction is directly vested in the Florida supreme court
upon a finding by a lower court that a statute is unconstitutional.
6. 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973) (Roberts, J., concurring; Boyd, J., dissenting).
7. E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
8. For a history of libel law, see Verder, The History and Theory of the Law of
Defamation, pt. 1, 3 CoLUmn. L. REV. 546 (1903); Verder, The History and Theory of the

Law of Defamation, pt. 2, 4 CoLUM. L. REv. 33 (1904). Other areas of speech not protected
in publication or discourse are obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); fighting
words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); and certain aspects of commercial
speech, Breard v. Alexandria, 341 US. 622 (1951). In addition, it has been argued that restrictions upon the media, which can be generally categorized under the right of privacy,
should be allowed. See Nimmer, The Right To Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. Rav. 935, 958-67 (1968).

9. See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (word
"blackmail" not defamatory); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966) (trial court's instruction to the jury in a criminal libel case too indefinite and uncertain); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (a statment is defamatory only if published with a knowing or reckless disregard for the truth).
10. See Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for News Media from
Liability for Defamation:Predictabilityand the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. Ray. 1547 (1972).

11. Basically, prior restraint is allowed only where the publication itself would be so
harmful that other remedies would be inadequate. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436 (1957) (injunction of publication after civil court determination that it was obscene).
But cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)

(injunction denied be-

cause Government failed to show that documents were top secret).
• 12. Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
13. Associates & Aldrich Co., Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971).
14. Chicago Joint Bd. ACW v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970).
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garded as a sanctuary for free expression, 15 and its existence, unhampered by
governmental intervention, has been considered the best assurance of "uninhibited, robust, and wide open debate."'16
While few restrictions have been imposed upon the press, the Government
has regulated the broadcasting media to ensure that monopolistic control
does not inhibit the flow of information to the public."7 The United States
Supreme Court has approved this concept by recognizing the fairness doctrine,
under which broadcasters must give adequate coverage to public issues and
fairly mention opposing viewpoints.'3 Consequently, the Federal Communications Commission maintains direct supervisory powers over the broadcast
media, compelling coverage at the broadcaster's expense if sponsorship is unavailable. 19 This doctrine has been applied exclusively to the broadcasting
media, since it is based upon the premise that regulation of publication is
permissible only in a governmentally created and controlled area.20
Right of reply legislation, therefore, is unusual in that it imposes a restraint comparable to the fairness doctrine upon the press.21 Florida's statute
is not unique, however, for several foreign countries enforce the right of
reply22 and four states have specifically embodied its principles in their

statutory law.23 In addition, approximately thirty states condition either the
award or amount of damages in a libel suit upon a newspaper's retraction of
any allegedly defamatory statements. 2 4 While such statutes encourage the immediate presentation of an individual's views, as do the right of reply statutes,
few courts have ever considered their constitutionality.25
15. "A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and
the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). "[O]ur liberty depends on the freedom of the press and that cannot
be limited without being lost." Thomas Jefferson, quoted in State ex rel. Singleton v. Woodruff, 153 Fla. 84, 86, 13 So. 2d 704, 706 (1943).
16. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
17. 47 U.S.C. §315 (1970). Because of the limited nature of broadcasting frequencies, the
"fairness doctrine" was enacted to prevent a station owner from presenting only his views
to the public. 13 F.C.C. REt. 1246, 1247 (1949).
18. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
19. Id. at 377.
20. Id. at 390. See also Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973).
21. Right of reply legislation generally compels a newspaper to give an individual or
candidate an amount of copy equal to the amount of space in which he was criticized. Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REV. 867, 887
(1948). The fairness doctrine compels a broadcaster to allow an individual air space equal
to the amount of time in which he was criticized. 13 F.C.C. REP. 1246, 1251-52 (1949).
22. E.g., Austria, France, Germany, Greece. Donnelly, supra note 21, at 884-85.
23. In addition to Florida, they are: Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. §23-3-35 (1972) (limited to candidate); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2739.13-.16 (Page 1954) (comprehensive
statute); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. §895.05(2) (1966) (emphasizing retraction, reply being of
secondary importance).
24. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. §30.160 (1972) (absent an intentional defamation, damages
recoverable only if request for retraction or correction has been denied); TENN. CODE ANN.
§23-2605 (Supp. 1972).
25. Concerning retraction statutes, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 Us.
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In a case of first impression, the instant court relied upon the underlying
26
policy of the first amendment to uphold Florida's right of reply statute.
Within the context of the electoral process, the court balanced the right of
the newspaper to publish without restraint against the right of the individual
to effectively defend his reputation and express his views.2 7 Determining that
the first amendment was intended to ensure the dissemination of information
to the public, especially in an electoral situation, the court stated that the
public's "need to know" could best be promoted by allowing a candidate the
28
right of reply.
As authority for its interpretation of the first amendment, the court discussed both the history of Florida's right of reply statute and the specific
language of the first amendment. 29 Citing to the Florida constitution 0 for the
proposition that the state must punish electoral abuses, the court stated that
the corrupt practice act of 1909 had been enacted to maintain "conditions conducive to free and fair elections." 31 Because the legislature had become fearful
that the power of the press, when turned to criticism of a candidate, might annihilate the candidate's ability to exercise free speech in self-defense, the right
of reply was incorporated into the 1913 corrupt practice act. 2 Thus, the court
reasoned, the right of reply does not abridge freedom of the press, but rather
expands it: it ensures that a candidate will be allowed to communicate his
views and thereby broadens the scope of information available to the public
in the electoral process. 33 The court's analysis of the legislative history of

254 (1964), where the United States Supreme Court decided a libel action without attaching
significance to the Alabama retraction statute under which the suit was instituted. This
silence could be construed as evidence of its constitutionality. As to right of reply legislation,
there are no high court decisions on point. Of the four jurisdictions that have such statutes,
only those of Florida and Mississippi have been considered. The Mississippi statute was considered in Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 So. 2d 91 (1953), where the court held that
the statute applied only to defamatory statements. The Florida statute was struck down as
unconstitutional in State v. News-Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp. 164 (County J. Ct. Volusia
County 1972).
26. 287 So. 2d 78, 87 (Fla. 1973).
27. Id. at 80.
28. Id. The court also considered three other issues, which were basically peripheral to
the holding of the case. The other issues were (I) whether a court of equity could intervene
in a criminal prosecution, (2) whether the statute was vague and overbroad, and (3) whether
compelling a newspaper to afford a candidate copy space was a deprivation of property rights.
Id. at 85, 86. A petition for rehearing centered on a determination of this last issue but the
court maintained its original position. The court held that (1) equity could enjoin criminal
prosecutions in exceptional circumstances, (2) the court should resolve any vagueness issue
of a constitutional statute in favor of its specificity, and (3) the statute was not an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights because it was a valid exercise of the state police
power. Id.
29. Id. at 80, 81.
30. FLA. CONsr. art. III, §26, art. IV, §4 (1885).
31. 287 So. 2d at 81.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Florida's right of reply statute was sound, 4 and several commentators have
agreed that such legislation does not abridge the first amendment. 35 Generally, however, state restrictions upon the freedom of the press, although designed to ensure fair elections, have been struck down where there has been
no showing of a clear and present danger to the general welfare.-',, Furthermore, despite the scarcity of case law on point,3 the mere fact that "no specific
newspaper content is excluded" S3 is perhaps questionable justification for
weakening historical safeguards and infringing upon the freedom of the press.
Consequently, the instant court bolstered its holding by emphasizing the
press's responsibility to present divergent opinions. 39 Traditionally, the judiciary has asserted that the very existence of a free press ensures a flow of
information to the public in the absence of governmental supervision.40 This
assertion has been strengthened by recent statements of prominent newspaper
publishers, affirming that the press is cognizant of its duty to inform the people. 41 The principal court, however, reasoned that a responsible press could
not be guaranteed without some statutory safeguards, since the modern trend
toward monopolization has resulted in "the voice of the press [becoming
more] exclusive in its observation and its wisdom, which in turn deprives the
public of their [sic] right to know both sides of controversial matters."' 2 While
the Miami Herald, defendant in the instant case, is perhaps a monopoly in
southern Florida,43 and the national press is becoming increasingly monopolistic in both size and dissemination of information, 44 the instant court made
34. See generally Keen, Brief History of the Corrupt Practice Acts of Florida, 9 FLA. L.J.
297 (1935).
35. Horning, The First Amendment Right of a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931, 937-41;
Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 581, 605 (1964); Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historical Decision: New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REV. 315, 346-47 (1965); Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1730, 1746-47 (1967).
36. E.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (newspaper prohibited from publishing
editorials on election day). See also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (ordinance prohibiting publications creating breach of peace); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)
(statute forbidding publications concerning "deeds of bloodshed and lust"); Musser v. Utah,
333 U.S. 95 (1948) (statute prohibiting publication advocating polygamy).
37. See note 25 supra.
38. 287 So. 2d at 82.
39. Id.
40. See note 15 supra and text accompanying note 16 supra.
41. The American Newspapers Publishers' Association President, Stanford Smith, has
advised the Congress: "[O]nly legislation which grants an unqualified privilege from subpoena
will achieve the fundamental purpose of assuring a free flow of information to the public."
Miami (Fla.) Herald, Jan. 5, 1973, §A at 12, col. 1. Davis Taylor, publisher of the Boston
Globe, said in an accompanying statment: "[U]nder our concept of a free press, newspaper
publishers bear the ultimate responsibility to the public to preserve a free flow of information." Id.
42. 287 So. 2d at 83.
43. The Miami Herald, owned by Knight Newspapers, Inc., is the largest newspaper in
Florida, its size being greater than the next two largest Florida newspapers combined. TRED'm
MAGAZINE, March 1973, at 34.
44. See B. BAGDIKIAN, THE EFFETE CONSPIRACY AND OTHER CRIMES BY THE PREss 10, 11
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no allowance for small newspapers45 or the editorial freedom that allows expression of opinions reflecting the convictions of the writers rather than of
the "monopolistic" owners. 46
In addition to the foregoing policy considerations, the instant court compared the fairness doctrine with the right of reply,47 relying principally upon
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,4 8 despite the fact that Red Lion has
never been judicially extended beyond the broadcast media.4 9 Furthermore,
the recent case of Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. Democratic National

Committee0 narrowed the fairness doctrine and affirmed that a broad reading
of Red Lion, such as that in the instant case, is inappropriate. In C.B.S. the
Supreme Court held that the fairness doctrine does not compel broadcasters
to accept paid editorial advertisements, although the admitted purpose of the
first amendment is to facilitate the flow of information to the public.51 The
Court stated that Red Lion should not be interpreted as standing for the
that in no instance
principle that "everyone should speak" 52 and implied
53
should the fairness doctrine be extended to the press.
In the instant decision the majority of the court made no mention of
C.B.S.5 4 and extended Red Lion and the fairness doctrine to the right of reply
on two grounds. First, the court stated that the right of reply tends to prevent monopolization of expression, a purpose of the first amendment expounded in Red Lion.55 Second, the court cited to dicta in the recent decision
of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia:56

(1972); Note, Resolving the Free Speech-Free Press Dichotomy: Access to the Press Through
Advertising, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 295-99 (1969).

45. "Where, as is often the case, there are many candidates competing for several offices,
it becomes a practical impossibility, even for large newspapers, to comply by providing each

with equal space. In the case of a small newspaper, because of inherent space and budget
limitations, it would be forced to abandon all efforts at comprehensive, intelligent and
analytical coverage of electoral news events, upon pain of jail sentence. Faced with an ap-

parent dilemma of this sort, a newspaper will choose not to publish anything at all, rather
than face financial ruin or prison." Brief for Sebring News, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 2,
Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78.
46. For example, one Gannett newspaper endorsed Governor Askew, while another supported Jack Matthews, and Gannett newspapers endorsed both Nixon and McGovern in
editorials. Brief for Today as Amicus Curiae at 2, Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.,
287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973).

47. 287 So. 2d at 83-84.
48. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
49. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
50. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).

51. Id.
52. Id. at 101.
53. Id. at 117-18.
54. The court stated only that it had "carefully considered appellee's argument that
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v .F.C.C.... is inapplicable." 287 So. 2d at 84.

55. Id.
56. 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971).
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If the states fear that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction
of insuring their ability to respond rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern.
The Rosenbloom court supplemented this statement by a footnote stating that
"some states have adopted retraction statutes or right of reply statutes." 5 7
While this may be support for the holding in the instant case, Rosenbloom
can be distinguished as a defamation suit against a radio station by a magazine distributor. 58 Its application is tenuous in the instant factual situation,
which involves governmental regulation of the press in an area not previously
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court. 59
Although the majority in the instant decision did not distinguish C.B.S.,
Justice Roberts' concurrence centered on this issue. He emphasized the reluctance in C.B.S. to give monied interests the power to force broadcasters to
accept their advertisements.60 Under Florida's right of reply statute, a candidate does not pay for the space and may demand his right of reply only after
the newspaper has initiated an attack against him. Therefore, the fear of a
candidate monopolizing press copy by reason of financial advantage is groundless. Justice Roberts concluded that "our opinion in the instant case in no
way conflicts with ... C.B.S.,"' 1 but it is doubtful that this assertion is valid
in light of the dicta in C.B.S. implying that the fairness doctrine should not
62
be extended to the news media.
While the fairness doctrine per se should not be extended to right of reply
legislation, other aspects of the instant decision find greater support in case
law. The court correctly declared that policies underlying the first amendment
made the people's right to be informed of paramount importance. The first
amendment does not protect the press from all forms of restraint, nor does it
ensure an individual free expression of all views. 63 Therefore, insofar as the
right of reply reasonably expands the scope of information available to the
people, it supports first amendment policy and does not "abridge" freedom of
the press. However, the instant court's departure from the well-established
principle of governmental abstention is much too sweeping. The most satisfactory result for all parties could probably have been achieved by limiting, or
strictly construing, the right of reply. If a candidate or individual could demand free press copy upon publication of only defamatory or libelous state-

57. Id. n.15.

58. Rosenbloom suggested right of reply legislation as a possible alternative to damage
suits that operate as repressive burdens on the press. Dealing with libel, Rosenbloom recognized the established principle that restraints on the press are to be narrowly construed
. Therefore, Rosenbloom
and held for the radio station, and not for the individual. Id. at
is at best questionable authority for expanding the scope of restraints on the press.
59. See notes 7, 8 supra.
60. 287 So. 2d at 88 (Roberts, J., concurring).
61.

Id.

62. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
63. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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ments,64 many of the problems inherent in the instant decision could be alleviated. There is, for example, precedent for restricting the publication of
libel, 05 and the possibility of a vague statute66 is lessened, as the scope of
libelous material has been frequently defined by the United States Supreme
Court. 67 Furthermore, the right of the individual to protect his reputation by
immediate expression in self-defense would be upheld and, in the majority of
jurisdictions, the printing of such a reply would mitigate the press's apprehension of damage judgments collectible in a libel suit.68 Thus, a compromise
would be achieved between individual expression and freedom of the press.
More importantly, the scope of information available to the people would be
enlarged in accord with the fundamental principle of the first amendment.
BARBA1A ALDEN RoPEs

64. See Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 So. 2d 91 (1953).
65. See notes 8, 9, 10 supra and accompanying text
66. One of the issues before the court in the instant case was vagueness and overbreadth.
See note 27 supra.
67. See note 9 supra.
68. See Chafee, PossibleNew Remedies for Errors in the Press, 60 HARV. L. Rxv. 1 (1964);
Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867
(1948); Lefar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REv. 423 (1952).
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